Why “It Worked for the Last Show” Is Not a Safety Argument
If you spend enough time in educational theaters, you will eventually hear someone say it.
“We did it this way last time and nothing happened.”
It sounds reassuring. It feels practical. It is also one of the weakest safety arguments you can make in a performing arts environment.
The fact that something did not fail before does not mean it was safe. It only means the system tolerated the risk that time. Understanding why this distinction matters requires examining how human factors, organizational pressures, and technical systems interact in ways that make educational theater particularly vulnerable to what safety scientists call “normalization of deviance.”
Success Does Not Equal Safety
In theater, we routinely operate systems designed to absorb error. Rigging systems incorporate design factors of 8:1 or higher per ANSI E1.6-1 (Entertainment Technology Association, 2019). Electrical systems include circuit protection per NFPA 70 Article 520 (National Fire Protection Association, 2023). Platforms flex before they collapse. People compensate instinctively for conditions that feel wrong.
When a show “works,” what we are often celebrating is not safety but margin. We consumed some of the engineered tolerance and got away with it.
This phenomenon is well documented in safety science. Dekker (2011) describes it as “drift into failure,” where small, incremental changes accumulate over time until the system operates far outside its original design parameters. Each individual decision seems reasonable in isolation, but the aggregate effect is a fundamental transformation of the risk profile.
Every time a risky practice is repeated without consequence, it becomes normalized. Over time, the absence of failure is misinterpreted as proof of correctness. Vaughan (1996) termed this “normalization of deviance” in her analysis of the Challenger disaster, where NASA engineers progressively accepted O-ring erosion as normal because previous flights had not failed. The same pattern appears in theater: a temporary measure becomes permanent, a workaround becomes standard practice, and eventually nobody remembers why the proper method existed in the first place.
Why This Argument Persists in Educational Theater
“There were no problems last time” survives because it serves multiple institutional purposes.
It avoids conflict with directors and designers who may not understand technical constraints. It sidesteps budget conversations about proper equipment or additional labor. It protects against admitting that something may have been wrong all along, which carries implications for past shows and institutional liability.
In educational settings specifically, this argument carries additional weight. Schools operate under resource constraints that professional venues do not face. The technical director may be teaching five classes, directing a show, maintaining the facility, and managing student labor. When faced with a choice between following proper procedure and getting the show open on time with available resources, the pressure to rely on “what worked before” becomes acute.
Reason (1997) identifies this as a classic organizational accident precondition: production pressure overwhelming safety considerations. Educational theater compounds this with role ambiguity. The technical director serves simultaneously as educator, technician, supervisor, and often the sole person with comprehensive technical knowledge. This creates what Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) call “structural secrecy,” where critical safety information exists only in one person’s head and disappears when they leave.
The institutional memory defense is particularly insidious in schools. If a system has been used the same way for years, questioning it can feel like questioning the competence of respected colleagues or predecessors. But safety does not care about intent, experience, or institutional history. Physics responds only to load, force, and material properties.
The Near Miss Problem
Most theater accidents are preceded by dozens or hundreds of near misses (Heinrich, 1931; Bird & Germain, 1985). Those near misses rarely get documented in educational settings for several reasons:
Students may not recognize a near miss when they see one due to limited experience. Staff may not report near misses because nothing actually broke or nobody got hurt. The pressure to maintain production schedules discourages pausing to document incidents that did not result in injury or damage. And critically, many educational institutions lack formal near-miss reporting systems entirely.
Consider common near-miss scenarios:
A counterweight arbor that deflects excessively during loading but returns to position. This may indicate bending of the arbor, guide misalignment, or approaching the working load limit of the system. ANSI E1.6-1 specifies maximum deflection limits and inspection requirements (Entertainment Technology Association, 2019), but without documentation, the pattern of progressive degradation remains invisible.
A temporary cable path across a crossover that cast and crew step over successfully all week. This violates OSHA 1910.22(a)(2) regarding walking surfaces (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2023) and creates a tripping hazard, but because nobody trips, the hazard is not addressed.
A platform leg that loosens incrementally but does not fail. Each performance loads the connection, working it slightly looser, until catastrophic failure occurs during strike or the next production setup when load conditions change.
Each incident teaches the wrong lesson if nothing goes wrong. The lesson becomes: this is fine. The problem is not that people take risks. The problem is that the system never tells them how close they came to the edge.
Professional Judgment vs. Precedent
Standards and codes are essential, but they do not cover every situation you will encounter. ANSI E1.6-1 provides rigging specifications. NFPA 70 covers electrical installation. ANSI E1.21 addresses entertainment facility fire safety (Entertainment Technology Association, 2013). But many decisions that matter most in theater safety live in the gray areas between these standards.
This is where professional judgment becomes critical.
Judgment asks different questions than tradition:
What load path am I actually creating? This requires understanding not just the rated capacity of components but how forces distribute through the system. A beam may be rated for 1,000 pounds at midspan, but adding a point load 18 inches from the end creates entirely different stress conditions.
What happens if one component fails? Redundancy is fundamental to safe rigging design, but only if failure of any single component does not cause progressive collapse of the system. ANSI E1.6-1 Section 4.3.6 requires that “the failure of any single component shall not cause the uncontrolled movement of a load” (Entertainment Technology Association, 2019, p. 12).
What assumptions am I making about behavior and timing? Theater involves human performance, which introduces variability. A cue that worked flawlessly in tech because the actor hit their mark precisely may fail in performance when they stand two feet upstage, changing sightlines or creating an obstruction.
What has changed since the last show, even if the setup looks the same? Personnel turnover, equipment degradation, modifications to the building systems, or changes in how the space is used between productions all alter the risk profile.
If your primary defense of a decision is past success, you are no longer evaluating risk. You are defending habit. This is antithetical to what Hollnagel (2014) terms “Safety-II” thinking, which recognizes that safety is not the absence of accidents but the presence of adaptive capacity to recognize and respond to changing conditions.
Shared Systems Amplify the Problem
In venues with shared consoles, shared rigging, or rotating crews, “it worked last time” becomes especially dangerous.
The last show had different people with different training levels and different supervision. Different cues with different timing and different failure modes. Different loads creating different stress on components. Different time pressure affecting decision-making quality.
The system may look the same, but the risk profile is not.
Educational theaters exemplify this problem. Student crews turn over annually. Each new generation must relearn the systems, but institutional knowledge transfer is often informal and incomplete. The technical director who knows that “the third electric can only take 800 pounds even though it’s rated for 1,200 because the grid beam is undersized” may communicate that verbally, but it rarely appears in documentation. When that TD leaves, the knowledge disappears.
ANSI E1.6-1 addresses this through requirements for documentation and load ratings posted at rigging positions, but compliance in educational settings is inconsistent. The standard requires that “the safe working load for each rigging point shall be posted or otherwise made available” (Entertainment Technology Association, 2019, p. 15), yet many school theaters operate with minimal documentation beyond what came with the building decades ago.
A Better Framework: Risk Assessment
Instead of asking whether something worked before, ask this: What is preventing it from failing?
If you cannot answer that clearly, with identifiable controls or margins, you do not have a safety argument. You have a story.
Formal risk assessment provides the framework for answering this question. The hierarchy of controls, established by OSHA and widely adopted in safety management, offers a systematic approach:
Elimination: Can the hazard be removed entirely? Do we need to fly that piece, or can it be placed on deck? This is the most effective control but often the least considered in theater because it may conflict with artistic vision.
Substitution: Can we replace the hazardous process with something safer? Substituting a lighter material for a flown scenic element reduces the consequences of rigging failure.
Engineering controls: Can we modify the system to make it inherently safer? Installing positive locking mechanisms on platforms, using properly rated shackles instead of improvised connections, or adding secondary safety attachments to flown elements are engineering controls.
Administrative controls: Can we manage the risk through procedures and training? Load calculations, inspection protocols, and documentation systems are administrative controls. They are less reliable than engineering controls because they depend on consistent human performance, but they are often the only option available in educational settings with limited budgets.
Personal protective equipment (PPE): This is the least effective control because it does nothing to reduce the hazard and relies entirely on correct and consistent use. Hard hats and safety glasses are essential, but they should never be the primary defense against a hazard that could be eliminated or engineered out.
Applying this framework requires documentation. You cannot perform risk assessment without understanding what the actual risks are, and you cannot understand risks without data. This means implementing near-miss reporting, conducting regular inspections per manufacturer guidelines and ANSI E1.6-1 requirements, and documenting decisions about deviations from standard practice.
What This Means for Technical Directors in Educational Theater
If you are a technical director in an educational setting, this matters more than you may realize.
Your role carries legal and ethical responsibilities beyond getting the show open. OSHA General Duty Clause 5(a)(1) requires employers to provide “employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm” (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2023). In educational institutions, this extends to students under your supervision.
When staff or students feel pressured to justify decisions using past success, they stop reporting concerns. When near misses are dismissed, hazards go underground. When safety relies on memory instead of documentation, it disappears with staff turnover. Creating safer educational theaters is not about eliminating creativity. It is about refusing to let luck masquerade as competence.
This requires building organizational systems that support safety:
Establish formal near-miss reporting. Create a simple system where anyone can report something that seemed wrong, even if nothing broke. Review these reports regularly and share lessons learned. The goal is not to assign blame but to identify patterns before they result in injury.
Document decisions. When you make a decision that deviates from standard practice or involves accepting calculated risk, write it down. Include what the risk is, why you are accepting it, what controls you are implementing, and what would trigger re-evaluation. This protects you legally and ensures knowledge transfer to your successor.
Conduct and document inspections. ANSI E1.6-1 Section 5 specifies inspection requirements for rigging systems (Entertainment Technology Association, 2019). Many educational institutions ignore this entirely. Develop an inspection schedule, train people to perform inspections competently, and maintain records. When you find deficiencies, document them and your corrective actions.
Train students in safety culture, not just procedures. Teaching a student how to tie a bowline is necessary but not sufficient. They need to understand why we use specific knots for specific applications, how to recognize when a line is approaching its working load limit, and why they should speak up if something feels wrong. This is what Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) call “mindfulness,” the organizational capacity to detect and respond to weak signals before they become strong problems.
Push back on production pressure. This is perhaps the hardest responsibility. When a director wants something that you cannot do safely with available resources, you must say no and explain why. When administrators expect you to produce Broadway-quality shows with community theater budgets, you must articulate the safety implications. This advocacy is part of your professional obligation.
The ESTA Technical Standards Program, which develops ANSI standards for the entertainment industry, exists because our profession has a poor safety record. Riggers have been killed by rigging failures. Electricians have been electrocuted. Students have fallen from catwalks and been struck by scenery. Every major standard in entertainment technology was written in response to injuries and fatalities that proper practice could have prevented.
The Institutional Challenge
Educational institutions face unique challenges in implementing robust safety programs. Budget constraints limit equipment purchases and facility upgrades. Academic calendars compress production schedules. Student labor creates constant turnover and variable skill levels. The technical director often works in isolation without professional peers for consultation.
These are real constraints, but they do not eliminate the obligation to provide safe working conditions. They require creative solutions:
Collaborate with other schools. Share inspection costs, develop common documentation templates, establish peer review for complex rigging designs. The Educational Theatre Association (EdTA) and United States Institute for Theatre Technology (USITT) provide networks for this collaboration.
Involve administration in risk decisions. When budget constraints prevent proper solutions, document the risk and make administrators aware. This creates shared responsibility and may unlock resources. More importantly, it creates documentation if an incident occurs.
Use limitations as teaching opportunities. Students in educational theater learn not just technical skills but professional practice. Teaching them to recognize and articulate safety concerns, to document decisions, and to advocate for proper practice prepares them for professional careers far better than teaching them to make do with inadequate resources.
Develop relationships with professional inspectors. Many jurisdictions require periodic inspections by qualified inspectors for overhead rigging systems. Use these inspections as learning opportunities. Ask questions. Have students observe. Build relationships so you have someone to consult when you encounter unfamiliar situations.
Safety Is Not Proven After the Fact
Theater is full of things that work right up until the moment they do not.
Wire rope shows minimal visible degradation until it suddenly fails. Wooden structural members support loads successfully until hidden decay compromises their capacity. Electrical connections carry current for years until corrosion creates a high-resistance point that arcs and ignites.
Safety is demonstrated before the show opens, not after the curtain comes down. This means design review, load calculations, inspection of equipment, testing of systems, and documentation of decisions. It means recognizing that the engineering margin built into systems is there for the unexpected, not as a buffer for intentional overload.
If the only evidence you have is that nothing went wrong last time, you are already relying on the wrong system. You are relying on luck, and luck is not a control measure.
The safety literature is unambiguous on this point. Reason (1997) demonstrates that organizational accidents result from latent failures that accumulate over time. Dekker (2011) shows that systems drift into failure through small, incremental changes that seem reasonable in local context. Hollnagel (2014) argues that safety requires continuous monitoring and adaptation, not just compliance with static rules.
Moving Forward
Changing organizational culture is difficult, especially in institutions where “we have always done it this way” carries the weight of tradition. But it is possible, and it starts with refusing to accept past success as evidence of safety.
The next time someone justifies a practice by saying “it worked last time,” ask these questions:
What is the rated capacity of the system and what load are we applying? What is our design factor? ANSI E1.6-1 requires minimum 8:1 for personnel lifts and 5:1 for scenery (Entertainment Technology Association, 2019). Are we meeting this?
What inspection protocol are we following and when was the last inspection? ANSI E1.6-1 Section 5 specifies inspection requirements. Can we demonstrate compliance?
What happens if this component fails? Do we have redundancy? Is there a secondary safety system?
What has changed since the last time we did this? Different people, different cues, different timing, different loads, different building conditions?
What documentation do we have? Load calculations, rigging plots, inspection records, manufacturer specifications?
If you cannot answer these questions, you do not have a safety system. You have an accident waiting for the right combination of circumstances.
Educational theater technical directors carry enormous responsibility. You are teaching the next generation of theater professionals. The safety culture you model, the documentation practices you implement, and the professional judgment you demonstrate will shape how your students approach safety throughout their careers.
That is a responsibility worth taking seriously, even when production pressure and resource constraints make it difficult.
Because the goal is not just to get this show open. The goal is to ensure that everyone involved goes home healthy at the end of every performance, every strike, every build session. And that requires building systems that do not depend on luck.
References
Bird, F. E., & Germain, G. L. (1985). Practical loss control leadership. International Loss Control Institute.
Dekker, S. (2011). Drift into failure: From hunting broken components to understanding complex systems. Ashgate Publishing.
Entertainment Technology Association. (2013). ANSI E1.21-2013: Temporary ground-supported overhead structures used to cover stage areas in the entertainment industry.
Entertainment Technology Association. (2019). ANSI E1.6-1-2019: Entertainment technology—Powered hoist systems.
Heinrich, H. W. (1931). Industrial accident prevention: A scientific approach. McGraw-Hill.
Hollnagel, E. (2014). Safety-I and Safety-II: The past and future of safety management. Ashgate Publishing.
National Fire Protection Association. (2023). NFPA 70: National Electrical Code.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. (2023). OSHA General Industry Standards, 29 CFR 1910.
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Ashgate Publishing.
Vaughan, D. (1996). The Challenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA. University of Chicago Press.
Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2007). Managing the unexpected: Resilient performance in an age of uncertainty (2nd ed.). Jossey-Bass.